The Strategists
Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, Mussolini and Hitler –
How War Made Them,
and How They Made War
Phillips Payson O'Brien
London : Viking, an imprint of Penguin Books, 2024
Paperback 544pp RRP $36.99
Reviewer: David Rees, February 2025
In this enthralling book about the key strategists of the Second World War, O'Brien, the author, has crafted a history of the war that focuses on the outcomes of some of the strategic decisions made by five critical leaders of the war, namely: Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini. O’Brien is a professor of strategic studies at St Andrew's University in Scotland, so the book is well-researched and remarkably easy to read, making it a perfect choice for those interested in the Second World War's history. It includes 45 pages of Endnotes, an extensive Bibliography, an Index, and many black and white photographs of the leaders during their lifetime.
O'Brien argues that if one wants to understand strategy, one must first understand the strategist. Therefore, it is essential to research the leaders' backgrounds and see how their experiences of previous wars influenced their strategic decisions during the Second World War. The revisionist type narrative analyses in detail how effective the leaders’ strategic choices were in meeting or failing to meet the personal aims of each leader. In hindsight, many decisions were individualistic or idiosyncratic and not always made in the national interest.
The author also points out that the leaders’ public speeches and written plans frequently didn’t reveal the leader's true intentions. They tended to distract people away from the hidden strategy using the diplomatic ‘smoke and mirrors’ technique of negotiating policy.
Apart from Roosevelt, who became the Assistant Secretary to the US Navy in the First World War and did not serve in the military, the four others did serve in their country's military. However, Roosevelt did visit Verdun in 1918, which significantly impacted his views about the futility of using troops against the new destructive weapons of war. Churchill served part-time as the Battalion Commander of the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers in Flanders, Hitler served with the 16th List Regiment on the western front, Mussolini served with the Italian 11th Bersaglieri Regiment near Trieste and Stalin served in the Red Army. Hitler's war experiences led him to believe that to win a battle, the military needed bigger weapons and good protective armour rather than speed of movement on the ground. It also needed an air force that prioritised ground support. Roosevelt and Churchill believed in providing powerful and speedy air, sea, and land capabilities with good logistics while avoiding significant troop confrontations.
The book describes how the three Allied leaders interacted with each other at the conferences held in places such as Casablanca, Yalta and Teheran. They tried to sort out their differences, such as when Roosevelt and Stalin wanted to prioritise the support for an early troop landing in France in 1943. In contrast, Churchill wished to prioritise troop landings in the Mediterranean. The leaders eventually agreed to prioritise equally against the wishes of their military staff.
The author concludes by stating that the idea that each leader had a clear and logical national strategy is a myth, and some people, in writing history, make strategic thinking more complex than it really is. However, this book is as much about top-level leadership as it is about grand strategy during wartime and is still highly recommended.
The RUSI – Vic Library is most grateful to the publisher for making this work available for review.
