How to Lose a War
The Story of America’s Intervention in Afghanistan
Amin Saikal
Cambridge, MA, USA: Yale University Press, 2024
Hardback 320pp RRP $39.95
Reviewer: Robert Dixon, February 2025
This is an account of the West's failures in Afghanistan from 9/11 to the fall of Kabul and the return of the Taliban to power in August 2021. It is a methodically documented and very detailed account which has as its focus the failure of the West (and various US administrations in particular) to ensure that there was a stable post-Taliban government in Afghanistan capable of unifying the divergent factions between political opponents and diverse tribes. The documentary material is augmented by much new information obtained from high-level Afghani sources, mostly members of the various Afghani governments established by the US. The level of detail is such that I think the book is best approached by readers already familiar with the history of the war in Afghanistan and with US government foreign policy since 9/11. In relation to the latter the author pays particular attention to the agreement reached between the (very impatient it would seem) Trump administration and the Taliban in early 2020. As the author points out ‘it basically addressed the Taliban’s fundamental demands in return for very little’ (p 124). It is also notable that the Afghan government was excluded from the discussions which led to this ‘Doha Accord’ - did someone say ‘Ukraine’? The Accord did not provide for a universal ceasefire, but instead only for one between the Taliban and the US and allied forces. After the signing of the bilateral US-Taliban deal, the US stopped supporting the Afghan military in its offensive operations, insurgent attacks against Afghan security forces surged while attacks on US and allied forces declined dramatically.
In addition to drawing attention the failure to secure a reliable and effective Afghan leadership and a workable system of governance the author also discusses other factors which led to the defeat. Foremost is the role of Pakistan in providing a safe haven and logistic support for the Taliban. The book makes it clear that the failure to have the support of Pakistan virtually guaranteed that it was only a matter of time before the US and its allies had to accept failure. This was in marked contrast to the 1980s when Pakistan was the base for the Saudi-American alliance supporting the mujahideen against the Soviets. The author also draws attention to the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 which resulted in military resources being devoted to the war in Iraq at the expense of the war in Afghanistan.
I mentioned above that the focus of the book is on the failure to establish a stable Western-style democratic government in Afghanistan. The author argues that the failure was largely due to the imposition of a highly centralised system of government when a more decentralised and federal system of government might have better suited a country with such marked tribal divisions. How to Lose a War provides a timely warning for Western policy makers seeking to reshape non-Western and tribal countries in their own image.
The book has one very useful map of Afghanistan, 37 pages of Endnotes, seven pages of References (the number of pages devoted to Notes and References is indicative of how detailed the book is) and a twelve-page Index (which does not include any mention of Australia or Australian forces).
The author, Amin Saikal (born in Kabul, Afghanistan), is Emeritus Professor of Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies, and the Founding Director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Australian National University. He is the author of a large number of books including The Rise and Fall of the Shah: Iran from Autocracy to Religious Rule (2009), Modern Afghanistan. A History of Struggle and Survival (2012) and Iran at the Crossroads (2015).
The RUSI – Vic Library is most grateful to the publisher for making this work available for
